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INTRODUCTION
The information, telecommunication and broadcasting sector is increasingly integrated into
the day to day activities of businesses and lives of households and individuals worldwide.
Numerous studies have shown that ICTs contribute to economic growth, employment and
social inclusion. It is therefore important that policymakers monitor progress towards access
and usage of ICTs. A paper by Roller and Waverman (2001) suggests that the spread of modern
fixed-line networks in OECD countries was responsible for one-third of output growth between
1970 and 1990. The importance of ICTs for economic growth is further supported by studies
from Jalava & Pohjola (2002), Oliner & Sichel (2000), Pohjola (2001), Niininen (2001), Sichel
(1997), Jorgenson et al (2005), OECD (2003) and UNCTAD (2006). Waverman et al (2005)
investigate the role of mobile phones in developing economies and find that they are playing
the same crucial role that fixed telephony played in developed economies in the 1970s and
1980s. Their study covered 38 developing countries for the period 1996 to 2003 and provides
evidence of the strong impact of mobile in developing countries.
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ABSTRACT: This paper uses data from nationally representative household surveys conducted in 17 African countries to analyse
mobile adoption and usage. The paper shows that countries differ in their levels of ICT adoption and usage and also in factors that
influence adoption and usage. Income and education vastly enhance mobile adoption but gender, age and membership of social
networks have little impact. Income is the main explanatory variable for usage. In terms of mobile expenditure the study also finds
linkages to fixed-line, work and public phone usages. These linkages need, however, to be explored in more detail in future. Mobile
expenditure is inelastic with respect to income, ie the proportion of mobile expenditure to individual income increases less than 1%
for each 1% increase in income. This indicates that people with higher income spend a smaller proportion of their income on mobile
expenditure compared to those with less income.
The study provides tools to identify policy intervention to improve ICT take-up and usage and defines universal service obligations
based on income and monthly usage costs. It helps to put a number to what can be expected from lower access and usage costs in
terms of market volume and number of new subscribers. Linking this to other economic data such as national household income
and expenditure surveys and GDP calculation would allow forecast of the economic and social impact of policy interventions.
Key policy interventions would be regulatory measures to decrease access and usage costs, rural electrification and policies to
increase ICT skills of pupils and teachers.
Keywords: ICT, Mobile access, Mobile usage, Income elasticity estimation, Gender.
1 Matthias Stork wrote his Master’s thesis about the RIA household survey with the topic Estimating Demand
Elasticities: Using Revealed and Stated Preferences Techniques. The Master’s thesis was submitted at the
University of Heidelberg, Germany in partial fulfilment for the MA Geography. 
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TABLE 1: ICT DENSITIES IN 2007 
Internet users  Main (fixed) Mobile cellular telephone 
per telephone lines per subscribers per 
100 inhabitants 100 inhabitants 100 inhabitants
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.47 3.17 26.77 
Low Income 6.04 5.87 24.06 
Lower Middle Income 15.69 15.23 50.99 
Upper Middle Income 31.48 21.01 86.18 
High Income Countries 54.78 43.85 112.42 
Benin 1.66 1.22 20.98 
Botswana 4.25 7.28 75.84 
Burkina Faso
2
0.59 0.70 10.90 
Cameroon
3
2.23 0.79 24.45 
Côte d’Ivoire
4
1.63 1.41 36.60 
Ethiopia 0.35 1.06 1.45 
Ghana 2.77 1.60 32.39 
Kenya 7.99 0.71 30.48 
Mozambique
5
0.93 0.33 15.42 
Namibia 4.87 6.66 38.58 
Nigeria 6.75 1.07 27.28 
Rwanda
6
1.08 0.24 6.53 
Senegal 6.62 2.17 33.31 
South Africa 8.16 9.56 87.08 
Tanzania 0.99 0.58 20.40 
Uganda 6.48 0.53 13.58 
Zambia 4.19 0.77 22.14 
Source: ITU database 2008
Country level data reveal a global digital divide between continents and countries but also
within countries (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003). Table 1 displays the difference between low,
lower-middle, upper-middle and high-income countries for Internet, fixed-line and mobile
density. It also displays the same information for countries covered by these studies and
the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) averages. The SSA average for Internet users and fixed-line
users is lower than the low income average. It can also be seen from Table 1 that several
countries from this 16-country sample are below the low income and SSA averages.
Countries have a much lower ICT density compared to the low-income average. Table 2
and 3 document the digital divide within countries for access to fixed telephony in urban
compared with rural areas and knowledge about and usage of the Internet across
disposable income quartiles.
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2 Internet and main fixed line data from 2006
3 Internet and main fixed line data from 2006
4 Internet and main fixed line data from 2006
5 Main fixed line data from 2006
6 Internet data from 2006
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TABLE 2: URBAN VS RURAL FIXED-LINE ACCESS
Households 
with working 
fixed-line phones National Major Urban Other Urban Rural
Rwanda 0.10% 1.20% 0.00% 0.00%
Uganda 0.30% 1.60% 2.00% 0.00%
Tanzania 0.90% 2.80% 2.50% 0.20%
Mozambique 1.70% 7.30% 1.30% 0.00%
Cameroon 1.80% 3.50% 3.50% 0.00%
Kenya 2.30% 11.40% 0.90% 1.40%
Ghana 2.60% 6.30% 4.60% 0.30%
Nigeria* 2.70% 9.70% 5.70% 1.20%
Benin 4.60% 15.50% 6.80% 0.60%
Burkina Faso 4.70% 18.30% 16.70% 0.30%
Côte d’Ivoire 4.80% 10.80% 7.10% 1.30%
Ethiopia 7.60% 46.00% 22.70% 2.90%
Botswana 11.00% 7.80% 17.00% 8.70%
Senegal 11.70% 21.50% 19.20% 0.60%
Namibia 17.40% 34.10% 29.60% 7.90%
South Africa 18.20% 38.90% 18.50% 2.10%
Zambia* 2.44% 5.20% 7.55% 0.00%
Source: RIA 2007/2008 household survey
Bagchi & Udo (2007) state that African countries are not experiencing the benefits from ICT
that are being experienced by OECD nations and lag severely behind even global averages in
ICT adoption, in particular in investment-intensive infrastructure such as fixed-line telephony
and broadband Internet access.
7
McCormick & Onjala (2007) list the following reasons for the low level of ICT access and
usage in Africa:
! weak telecommunications infrastructure;
! generally low level of economic activity;
! irregular or non-existent electricity supplies; and
! lack of human resource capacity, lack of skills and brain drain.
19
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7 See also Sciadas (2003)
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TABLE 3: ICT KNOWLEDGE AND USE, AND MOBILE ACCESS ACROSS DISPOSABLE INCOME
CATEGORIES
16+ knowing what the Internet is 16+ using the Internet Owning a mobile phone or 
active SIM card
Lower three Top disposable Lower three Top disposable Lower three Top disposable
income quartile income quartile income quartile income quartile income quartile income quartile
in ppp terms in ppp terms in ppp terms in ppp terms in ppp terms in ppp terms
Benin 17% 33% 6% 16% 17% 63%
Botswana 14% 52% 2% 19% 53% 83%
Burkina Faso 6% 17% 2% 10% 19% 50%
Cameroon 35% 54% 10% 25% 28% 74%
Côte d’Ivoire 12% 31% 4% 14% 33% 63%
Ethiopia 6% 18% 0% 3% 1% 11%
Ghana 26% 27% 5% 8% 53% 79%
Kenya 25% 52% 9% 32% 42% 79%
Mozambique 2% 10% 1% 3% 20% 49%
Namibia 16% 60% 4% 25% 37% 86%
Nigeria 35% 52% 10% 22% 74% 93%
Rwanda 4% 13% 1% 4% 4% 26%
Senegal 37% 71% 9% 14% 29% 77%
South Africa 42% 75% 7% 38% 54% 84%
Tanzania 6% 16% 1% 4% 14% 46%
Uganda 4% 15% 1% 7% 12% 46%
Zambia 39% 60% 1% 13% 36% 84%
Source: RIA 2007/2008 household survey
The results from the researchICTafrica.net (RIA) household survey, however, shows that
the monthly cost of telecommunication services is the main reason behind low levels of access
and usage.
The great potential of ICTs as catalysts of social and economic development is clearly
recognised in continental discourses of agencies such as NEPAD, economic regional
association strategies and in national policies. ICT dissemination and adoption in developing
countries facilitates the achievement of major development goals in the areas of health,
education, governance and others. People in developing countries need easier and cheaper
access to ICTs. They need enhanced ICT skills to better employ these technologies in their
homes, schools and jobs. Policies and strategies that have been adopted, however, have not
been successful in addressing the question of how African countries can catch up with global
levels of ICT access and usage and how the poor can join the newly developing information
societies. For this it is important to understand the factors that lead to adoption of ICTs by
households and individuals. It is also important to understand what factors other than income
impact on usage once households or individuals have adopted ICTs.
20
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DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The data used for this study stem from surveys conducted by ResearchICTAfrica (RIA
8
in 17
African countries during the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008.
9
The data is nationally
10
representative on a household level and for individuals 16 years of age or older. The survey was
stratified into metropolitan, other urban and rural areas. Enumerator areas (EAs) were
sampled for each stratum using probability proportional to size (pps). The individual to be
selected for each household was randomly selected from all household members and visitors
who stayed at the home on the night the household was visited and who were 16 years of age
or older.
The RIA questionnaire was divided into three sections. The first part, the household
roster, collected information about all household members. The second part collected
household-related information. The head of the household, or someone who manages the
household, answered parts one and two. The third part, the individual section, was
answered by a randomly selected individual 16 years of age or older, who slept in the house
the night of the interview, and included household members and visitors.
A household constitutes a person or group of persons, irrespective of whether related or
not, who normally live together in the same housing unit or group of housing units, have
common cooking arrangements and share financial resources. Maids, guards and
babysitters who live with a family are part of the household. A head of a household is a
person who economically supports or manages the household, or for reasons of age or
respect is considered by members of the household as head, or declares himself or herself
to be head of a household.
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8 Research ICT Africa (RIA) is a network of universities and research institutions from 19 African countries hosted
at The EDGE institute, Johannesburg, South Africa. For more information see www.researchICTafrica.net.
9 These are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The data for Zambia are not included in
this analysis since that data had not been weighted by the time of submission of this article.
10 The data for Zambia and Nigeria are national extrapolations but not nationally representative. In Zambia the
selection probabilities had to be estimated since enumerator ID information was not unique. In Nigeria the sample
was drawn only from 6 of 36 provinces.
02 mobile telephony.qxp  2009/03/31  08:31 AM  Page 21
22
the southern african journal of information and communication issue 9 2008
TABLE 4: RIA 2007/2008 HOUSEHOLD SURVEY SAMPLE
Major Urban Other Urban Rural Total
Benin 432 336 333 1.101
Botswana 348 241 229 818
Burkina Faso 416 329 332 1.077
Cameroon 490 347 398 1.235
Côte d’Ivoire 502 312 298 1.112
Ethiopia 1.173 631 551 2.355
Ghana 473 324 295 1.092
Kenya 472 557 432 1.461
Mozambique 562 312 257 1.131
Namibia 311 294 280 885
Nigeria 895 1.012 844 2.751
Rwanda 415 333 330 1.078
Senegal 432 312 337 1.081
South Africa 779 465 527 1.771
Tanzania 634 393 463 1.490
Uganda 436 347 344 1.127
Zambia 405 212 264 881
Total 9.175 6.757 6.514 22.446
STATED AND REVEALED PREFERENCES
The RIA household survey collected information from mobile users about their monthly
expenditure, but also from non-users about their willingness and ability (WTP) to spend on
mobile telephony. The first is known as revealed and the latter as stated preferences. WTP
measures are widely used to provide information to policymakers regarding the economic
value of non-market, non-pecuniary or environmental goods. For stated preferences, no
behavioural changes can be observed; the individuals only state that they intend to behave in
that particular fashion. (Adamowicz et al, 1994).
The payment ladder method with exponentially distributed amounts was used to infer the
willingness and ability to pay for mobile services of non-users. The payment card was first
used by Mitchell & Carson (1984). The payment ladder is a kind of payment card which lists
WTP values from low to high. Enumerators read the values to the respondent, starting at the
top of the list and moving down. They asked until three values were answered with no. If the
respondents were almost certain about their willingness and ability to pay a monetary value
then a tick (\/) was placed in the space next to that amount. If the respondents were not sure
about an amount then it was simply left blank. If the respondents were almost certain that an
amount was too high then a cross (x) was placed next to the amount. Three crosses (NOs)
were required to complete the question to assure that no intransitivities occurred. The highest
amount the respondent was willing and able to pay and the lowest amount the respondent was
neither willing nor able to pay was captured. The difference between these two values is the
range of uncertainty. (Bann, 1999). Having two points increases the chance of eliciting the
respondents’ actual willingness to pay. The payment ladder avoids starting point bias and
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reduces the number of outliners (Bateman, 2002). To avoid range and centring biases
11
the
payment ladder was based on exponential value increment, as suggested by Row et al (1996).
This approach has three major advantages.
First, the scale is consistent with the hypothesis of increasing measurement error with
increasing value. For instance, a person might value a cup of coffee in a café at US$2 plus
minus US$0.20, but a vacation at US$2 000 plus minus US$200. Secondly, according to Row et
al (1996) there exists evidence that measurement errors in values obtained in contingent
valuation studies have a log-normal distribution and that a logarithmic transformation of the
WTP data addresses the increasing measurement error in hypothetical WTP data. Therefore
the exponential payment ladder can be seen consistent with the error distribution of WTP
values. The third argument Row et al (1996) put forward refers to the concept of “just
noticeable” differences and they use the example of light sources to explain this. A source of
light has a brightness B. The difference between two such sources is “just noticeable” if the
difference can be detected 75% of the time. When bringing these sources into a sequence
arranged in order of increasing brightness B1, B2, …, Bn, so that each source is “just
noticeable” from the preceding one, then the relationship each to the other is given by Weber’s
law:
B
n
- B
n-1
= k.B
n-1
(1)
where k is a positive constant. Hence the “just noticeable” differences are increasing
proportionally to the sequence of sources and can also been written by exponential function:
B
n
= B
1
.(1+ k)
n-1
(2)
The value of k can be seen as a percentage increase between adjacent scale values. The
survey used 28 values, starting with a zero (not interested at all) and ending with an empty cell
for amounts higher than listed. Equation (2) was used to compute the 2nd amount to the 27th
amount. K was selected so that (1 + k)n-1 equals the highest value on the list.
12
MOBILE ADOPTION / ACCESS
This section analyses factors that contribute to the probability of an individual to adopting
mobile telephony, ie either owning a mobile phone or active SIM card. The dependant variable
is dichotomous and using linear regression models would not be appropriate.
13
Probit models
are being used instead, assuming normal distributed error terms. The assumption about the
error term is arbitrary and its validity cannot be tested.
14
A model can only be identified once
an assumption is imposed on the mean and variance of the error term. This implies that
coefficients cannot be interpreted directly since they are influenced by the necessary
assumptions. Changing the assumptions about the error term changes the values of the
coefficients uniformly (Long, 2006). But it does not affect the probability of an event occurring
15
.
It affects the spread of the distribution but not the proportion of the distribution above or below
the threshold uniformly (Long, 2006).
The decision to adopt mobile telephony is the result of several factors that cannot be
observed and that will be different for each individual. What can be observed is whether an
23
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11 See Venkatachalam (2004) and Row et al (1996).
12 For example, with n = 24 cells which have to be computed and $1000 the highest value, the equation would be given
by 1000 = (1 + 0,35)23
13 See for example Maddala (1983) and Gourieroux (1986)
14 For a more detailed discussion on this assumption see Long (1997).
15 See Long (2007) pp 49-50 for a proof
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individual has a mobile phone or active SIM card (Mobile=1) or not (Mobile=0). One individual
might neither be able to afford nor be interested in a mobile phone while another might be close
to acquiring one and still saving money towards it. For both individuals it can only be observed
that they do not have a mobile phone, ie Mobile=0. The process leading to that decision is
unobserved and referred to a latent variable. Probit or Logit models tie observable
(independent variables) to the latent variable through contributions to the probability of the
latent variable taking a value above or below a threshold that would lead to the observable
outcome, adoption or not. Many factors are considered in the economic literature as
influencing the latent variable,
16
such as socio-economic factors (social networks, income,
prices, household size, education, age and gender) and environmental factors (infrastructures,
enumerator area, country’s characteristics).
Piccoli et al (2001) established that the education level of an individual influences ICT
adoption and usage, through influencing an individual’s capability to use technology. The
theory of technology use also points to age as a factor that influences when and how an
individual uses technologies. Some studies indicate that age is a key factor in the use of
technology, with younger people tending to exhibit higher use levels. Consequently, these
individuals tend to use ICT technologies more than older users.
Gender and technology studies have found that men and women adopt and use technology
differently. (Gefen & Straub, 1997; Venkatesh & Morris, 2000). Men’s decisions to use
technology are more strongly influenced by their perception of usefulness, while women’s
decisions are based more on perceptions of the technology’s ease of use. (Venkatesh & Morris,
2000). Further, men and women may view the same mode of communication differently.
17
16 See for example: Kwapong (2007) Fabiani et al (2005), Bagchi & Udo (2007), Kabbar & Crump (2006)
17 See Gefen & Straub (1997); Ono (2003)
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TABLE 5: PROBIT MODEL SPECIFICATION
Variable Variable Type of Variable Expected Comment
Name sign
Dependent Mobile Dichotomous variable: NA
Variable (M) Individual has a mobile or active 
SIM card = 1, 0 otherwise
Independent Income Continuous variable: Individual Positive Income is assumed to be 
Variables (I) income in US$ based on end of year the main barrier to adoption
nominal exchange rates (source IMF)
Gender Dichotomous variable: female = 1, Not The assumption is that there is 
(G) male = 0 significant no gender difference when it 
comes to mobile adoption
Age (A) In years Negative Technology being a domain for 
the younger generation
Tertiary Dichotomous variable: highest education Positive Education should enable 
(T) being tertiary = 1, otherwise 0 individuals to use mobile 
Secondary Dichotomous variable: highest education phones, while also being an
(S) being secondary = 1, otherwise 0 indicator for income, model
Primary Dichotomous variable: highest education would drop variables if multi-
(P) being primary, remedial or traditional collinearity persists
=1, otherwise 0
Vocational Dichotomous variable: highest education
(V) being vocational =1, otherwise 0
Rural Dichotomous variable: rural = 1, Negative Mobile network coverage is 
(R) urban =0 less in rural areas compared to
urban (major urban and other 
urban) ones and less adoption
is therefore expected 
Social  Dichotomous variable: social network Positive Membership in social networks
Network (as church groups, sports clubs etc.) might increase communication 
(SN) membership = 1, otherwise 0 need 
Constant Captures various factors that are either Negative Captures no education, but 
(C) constant for a country, such as the price also urban
for mobile or fixed telephony, or that 
serve as reference for dichotomous 
variables such as the educational 
variables and rural-urban location. 
Table 5 displays the Probit model configuration and Table 6 details the results for each
country. Table 6 provides summary results without reporting coefficients, showing for each of
the independent variables whether their impact on the probability of mobile adoption is
significant and whether it is positive or negative.
18
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18 The detailed results can be found in the appendix.
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TABLE 6: NATIONALLY REPRESENTATIVE PROBIT RESULTS FOR EACH COUNTRY USING SAMPLING WEIGHTS
Country Pseudo Prob Positive Coefficients + = significant at 0.1 level, ++ = significant at 0.05 level,+++ = 
R2 > significant at 0.01 level
chi2 Negative Coefficients - = significant at 0.1 level, — = significant at 0.05 level, —- = 
significant at 0.01 level
I A G T S P V R SN Constant
Benin 0.396 0.00 +++ ++ No +++ +++ +++ +++ —- No —-
Botswana 0.16 0.00 + No No ++ +++ No Skip — +++ No
Burkina Faso 0.253 0.00 +++ —- —- +++ +++ +++ Skip —- No No
Cameroon 0.258 0.00 +++ ++ No +++ +++ +++ ++ —- ++ —-
Côte d’Ivoire 0.292 0.00 +++ — No +++ +++ No +++ —- +++ No
Ethiopia 0.452 0.00 +++ No No +++ ++ No +++ —- No —-
Ghana 0.158 0.00 No - No +++ +++ +++ ++ —- ++ No
Kenya 0.258 0.00 +++ No No +++ +++ .++ +++ No ++ —-
Mozambique 0.214 0.00 +++ No +++ +++ +++ +++ No —- No —-
Namibia 0.224 0.00 +++ No No +++ +++ No No —- No No
Nigeria* 0.172 0.00 +++ — No +++ +++ No + No ++ No
Rwanda 0.244 0.00 No No No Skip +++ +++ Skip —- No —-
Senegal 0.215 0.00 ++ No —- +++ +++ ++ ++ —- No No
South Africa 0.171 0.00 +++ —- +++ +++ +++ No No —- No No
Tanzania 0.172 0.00 +++ + - Skip +++ +++ + —- +++ —-
Uganda 0.357 0.00 +++ + No +++ ++ No +++ —- No —-
Zambia* 0.2894 0.00 +++ No No Skip +++ +++ +++ Skip +++ —-
(source: RIA 2007/2008 household survey)
The results suggest that the variables used to analyse mobile phone adoption contribute
significantly to explaining the probability of adoption. Income increases the probability of
mobile phone adoption as expected. Only for Ghana and Rwanda was it not significant.
Substituting individual income with disposable income increases the pseudo R2 in both cases
and leads to income being significant with positive coefficient. Disposable income has the
advantage over individual income in that it takes into account the buying power of dependents
that do not have own income. It does not generally lead to better results, though. Income as a
barrier to adoption has two consequences. First, people will increasingly adopt mobile
telephony should their income increase. Secondly, they might adopt it at current income if
access (handset) prices and usage cost were to come down.
Age has a positive influence for some countries and a negative for others in the probability
of mobile adoption. Age is likely to have a positive impact on the probability to adopt mobile up
to a certain level and then the impact decreases. Using age2 instead of age in subsequent
research could solve this. 
19
The gender variable is mostly insignificant as expected (11 countries). Only in Senegal,
Tanzania and Burkina Faso does being a woman decrease the probability of mobile telephony
adoption. In South Africa and Mozambique it increases the probability significantly.
26
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19 See Tegegne (1999).
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The result from the Probit models confirms the assumptions about education as well as
those about the rural areas. Membership of social networks contributed positively to the
probability of mobile adoption in seven out of 16 countries. For the remaining countries it was
insignificant.
Randomly selected individuals older than 16 years from each household without mobile
phone or active SIM card were asked for their willingness and ability to pay for a handset and
what they thought a handset would cost them. These average figures are shown in Table 7. The
difference between average willingness to pay and average expected costs confirms income as
the main adoption barrier. Table 7 also indicates the number of new mobile phone users
operators could expect should they offer mobiles for US$20, US$15 and US$10 respectively.
US$20 handsets would attract about three million new customers in Kenya and Ivory Coast, for
example. Ethiopia could expect 2,6 million more users if the handset price dropped to US$10
and provided that SIM cards were available. Ethiopia is the country with the widest gap between
willingness to pay and expected cost and the country with the lowest mobile teledensity (see
Table 1). The handset price is also known to fluctuate with the availability of SIM cards.
TABLE 7: WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO PAY
Average willingness Average National
and ability to pay expected cost New users New users New users 
for a mobile of a mobile at US$20 at US$15 at US$10
handset in US$ handset in US$ for a handset for a handset for a handset
Benin 7.45 11.44 124 972 487 176 677 715
Botswana 19.14 27.38 119 014 196 496 228 203
Burkina Faso 8.92 12.84 427 032 1 242 397 1 451 446
Cameroon 15.11 22.16 864 053 1 728 316 1 865 876
Côte d’Ivoire 29.70 30.06 3 057 420 3 539 351 3 914 283
Ethiopia 6.06 64.19 1 436 628 1 637 668 2 644 673
Ghana 14.02 23.15 1 283 271 1 469 652 1 841 837
Kenya 16.98 26.68 2 857 406 4 160 498 5 658 430
Mozambique 4.00 23.2 56 457 79 895 287 147
Namibia 24.64 25.12 162 992 192 395 232 584
Nigeria* 5.65 12.57 356 907 1 004 573 2 527 884
Senegal 19.55 2 543.0 1 336 691 2 169 548 2 301 775
South Africa 17.44 32.41 2 549 812 3 251 782 3 991 768
Tanzania 10.89 17.3 1 422 927 2 102 510 3 272 065
Zambia* 17.42 22.43 682 864 1 061 607 1 598 555
(source: RIA 2007/2008 household survey)
INCOME ELASTICITY / E-USAGE
Perl (1983), Taylor (1994; 2002) developed telecommunication demand models that address
price and income elasticities for public phones, mobile phones and local, national and
international fixed-line calls as well as cross price elasticities.
20 
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20 See for example Kaserman et al (1990) and Parsons (1998)
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Universal Service Obligations (USO) in this context have been thoroughly discussed in the
literature.
21
Garbacz & Thompson (1997, 2002, 2003) find that price elasticities for landline
services in the USA approach zero in recent years and that subsidies therefore have little or
no impact on universal service. Crandall & Waverman (2000) Eriksson et al (1998) and
Hausman et al (1993) support these findings.
Wallsten (2001) finds that greatly reduced international settlement rates for telecom traffic
between the United States and the rest of the world had the effect of reduced prices and
increased traffic in developing countries due to relatively high price elasticities. However,
Garbacz & Thompson (2005) point out that international calls are of less relevance to poor
people in developing countries compared to local and national calls, where price elasticities
are low. They also find that the mobile monthly price elasticity exceeds fixed-line price
elasticity in developing countries by a substantial amount and suggest that wireline phones are
substitutes in the mobile market while mobile phones are not substitutes in the wireline market
but complements. This is to some extent contradicted by Esselaar & Stork (2005) who find
through studying usage data for nine African countries that mobile telephony is a substitute
for fixed-line telephony across all income groups.
Clarke & Wallsten (2002) argue that universal service for the poor in developing countries
is generally ineffective. Modelling income elasticities could establish alternative approaches to
current universal service definitions. Rather than specifying coverage or geographic spread,
universal service obligations (USOs) could be in terms of costs for monthly usage packages that
take into account existing income barriers.
Lee (1999) in estimating access demand for mobile networks, shows that per capita GDP
and the size of the existing fixed-line network increase the probability of people subscribing to
mobile telephone services. This implies that the mobile telephone network is interdependent
with the fixed-line network.
Demand, as understood by economists, is defined as the amount of goods or services people
are willing to buy at a certain price (ceteribus paribus – other things, including income, equal).
In this sense, demand is a concept affected by buying power. A person may have needs but no
demand, due to income limitations. With insufficient income, demand can be zero or low even
if the need is urgent. Demand or buying power for goods or services arises from the consumers’
preferences for specific goods or services. Thus defining  goods or a service, and studying how
the consumer orders his/her preferences for such a product or service in relation to other
available goods and services are crucial.
Demand arises from a previous knowledge of the product and a subjective evaluation of its
benefits and costs. Communications services differ from other goods or services since some
require a subscription prior to usage, such as post paid mobile and fixed line services. Even for
prepaid mobile services a distinction can be made between access (cost of a handset) and
usage costs. Subscription is necessary to use the Internet as well in most cases (notable
exception is the Internet café). In the case of telephony the access service provides utility to a
customer in terms of granting the ability to make and receive calls, even though it is uncertain
whether the ability will be exercised. This is the so-called option value (Hee Lee, 2006).
For the purpose of analysing demand income elasticity for mobile telecommunication
services we assume that the potential usage basket of a consumer consists of calls (q) and
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a composite product (x) that represent all other goods and services. We further assume that
the consumer’s decision on individual demand for calls is made by maximising a utility
function within a given budget constraint. In addition to the factors of calls (q) and a
composite product (x) affecting his/her utility, income (y) can be considered. Moreover, if
call externality is incorporated in the utility of an individual, the number of existing
subscribers who are making calls to and receiving calls from the individual affects the
demand for calls. Thus, after including the size of the network (N) in order to reflect call
externality, the utility function of a customer (U) is represented in expression (3):
U = U(q,x,N) (3)
At the same time, the budget constraint considering access charge and call charge is given
by 
(4)
Where r is the price of access to the telecommunications system, the price of a call, y
is income of the consumer and p the price of the composite product x. For the utility function
in (3), the number of calls represents direct benefits of using the mobile, while the number
of subscribers represents indirect benefits through network size. Given the budget
constraint in (4), and assuming the utility function is strictly quasi-concave and
differentiable, using Lagrangian techniques the demand functions for calls and the
composite product, as shown below in expressions (5) and (6), can be derived from the
optimal solution of the utility function:
(5)
(6)
These functions differ from conventional demand functions in two aspects: The budget
constraint is y-r, rather than y, which reflects the condition of having to purchase access to
telecommunication services, and the demand functions depend upon the number of
subscribers, which reflects the access and usage externalities. Perl (1983), Taylor (1994, 2002)
and Taylor and Kridel (1990) developed telecommunication demand models that are now
widely used in the literature. The model has the following form: 
(7)
Where q denotes use of the telephone network, p denotes the price of access and use, y
denotes income, and u denotes a random error term. Network externalities as well as current
socio-demographic factors can be included in this model as well.
22
Equation (7) can be
transformed by taking the natural logarithm of the left hand and right hand sides:
(8)
Where a = log A and Z the socio-demographic factors set. The transformed demand
functions for mobile phone services are then expanded by socio-economic factors and
postulated to be of following form:
(9)
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m = monthly mobile expenditure in US$, converted using nominal end of 2007 exchange
rates (source IMF)
Y= natural logarithm of individual income in US$, converted using nominal end of 2007
exchange rates (source IMF). The income is the sum of any salary or wage, self-employment
income, property income, income from agricultural produce, pension, transfer income and
scholarships.
A = age in years
PP = dichotomous public phone variable: used public phone in the last three months =1,
otherwise 0
WP = dichotomous work phone variable: access to a phone at work =1, otherwise 0
G = dichotomous gender variable, female=1, male=0
F = dichotomous fixed-line variable: fixed-line access at home =1, otherwise 0
SN =Dichotomous variable: social network (church groups, sports clubs etc.) membership
= 1, otherwise 0
R = Dichotomous variable: rural = 1, urban (other urban and major urban) =0
The price variable used in the analysis is represented by the amount that an individual paid
for access and usage of mobiles. However, since country results are being computed
individually, there will not be a change for any of the responses, the cost of the usage basket is
the same for everyone in a country. This lets the price variable become a constant.
Table 8 presents the results from robust regressions for each country, using weighted data.
Income is in each case significant and positively related to mobile expenditure.
The gender variable is insignificant for 10 countries, which is somewhat surprising given
that the average income of women is lower compared with that of men for all countries but
Mozambique. However income is already taken care of in the equation. This means that
although at different income levels, women spend the same on mobile phones as men. For
Botswana, Cameroon, Mozambique and Namibia, the gender variables were significant and
negative, which means that women spend less. Nigeria had the only positive significant
coefficient.
23
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TABLE 8: MOBILE EXPENDITURE - ROBUST REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EACH COUNTRY USING SAMPLING WEIGHTS
Country R2 Prob Only significant coefficients are being displayed: * = significant at 0.1 level,
> F ** = significant at 0.05 level, *** = significant at 0.01 level
Y A G WP PP F R SN
Benin 0.399 0.000 0.35*** 1.07*** -0.27***
Botswana 0.298 0.000 0.46*** -0.26**
Burkina Faso 0.206 0.000 0.33*** 0.28* 0.35***
Cameroon 0.22 0.000 0.27*** -0.32** -0.22* 0.54* -0.4*
Côte d’Ivoire 0.196 0.000 0.36*** -0.02* 0.45** 0.37* 0.34*
Ethiopia 0.353 0.000 0.29*** -0.01** -0.47*** 0.23*
Ghana 0.145 0.000 0.47*** -0.01**
Kenya 0.251 0.000 0.33*** -0.02*** 0.44*** 0.47***
Mozambique 0.189 0.000 0.11** -0.03*** -0.72*** 1.04***
Namibia 0.449 0.000 0.43*** -0.23* 0.37**
Nigeria 0.458 0.000 0.71*** 0.24*** -0.41* 0.24***
Rwanda 0.339 0.000 0.55*** 0.66***
Senegal 0.266 0.000 0.43*** 0.247*
South Africa 0.477 0.000 0.47*** -0.02*** 0.2** -0.2*** 0.3***
Tanzania 0.127 0.000 0.33*** 0.84**
Uganda 0.292 0.000 0.39 *** 0.48** -0.24* 0.43**
Zambia 0.378 0.000 0.52*** -0.01** 0.69***
Source: RIA 2007/2008 household survey
Having a working fixed-line phone at home is linked to higher mobile expenditure in eight
out of 16 countries. This can be explained by two factors. First, households with fixed-line
phones are generally wealthier, which might not directly be reflected in the individual income
of the respondent (dependents). Second, having a fixed-line phone at home provides more
opportunity to talk, such as calling home. These results confirm the existence of a relationship
between mobile and fixed-line networks. To contribute to the complementarity and
substitutability discussion further, the fixed-line expenditure would need to be investigated for
any effect through the number of mobile phone users in the household as well. The survey data
also can be used to explain usage pattern in more detail.
Public phone usage has only been significant for six out of 16 countries. For Benin,
Cameroon and South Africa it has a negative effect on mobile phone expenditure and for
Burkina Faso, Rwanda and Senegal a positive one. This too needs to be analysed in more detail.
Public phones might be used by predominantly lower income groups or might actually
substitute mobile phone expenditure. More country-specific research is required to arrive at
definite conclusions.
This applies equally, for the impact of access to a work phone or private use. In five
countries the work phone variable shows as positive and significant. While having access
to a work phone is a good indicator of income, one might also have suspected a negative
impact on mobile usage expenditure since the work phone could be used to substitute for
mobile calls.
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Age has a significant and negative impact in six countries where that variable is significant.
For those countries a youth user’s effect can be established.
The main objective is to estimate demand elasticities. A distinction is made between income
and price elasticities. Income elasticity describes the magnitude and also therefore the
responsiveness of a demand change for a product in respect of an income change. Graphically
expressed, the income elasticity is – ceteris paribus – the slope of the demand curve,
dependent on the income.
e
y = 
!Q/Q
!Y/Y
Where: Q = quantity demanded; Y = income and, e
y
= income elasticity.
The first derivative of the regression equation for income yields the coefficient for Y, which
is the income elasticity, that is, the percentage change in mobile expenditure at a 1% change in
income.
24 
The estimation results show that income variable is statically significant and positive
for all 17 countries.
FIGURE 1: INCOME ELASTICITY: PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN MOBILE EXPENDITURE FOR 1% CHANGE IN
INCOME.
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Figure 1 shows the percentage change in mobile expenditure for a 1% income change. For
all countries the mobile expenditure is inelastic with regard to income. Nigeria has the highest
income elasticity and Mozambique the lowest. Since these are national figures based on cross-
section data it implies that people with higher incomes spend a smaller proportion of their
income on mobile telephony compared to low income households. Figure 2 confirms this.
Income elasticity seems to be linked to relative cost of mobile usage, penetration and coverage.
Those factors need to be explored in more detail in subsequent studies utilising supply side
data and qualitative research.
FIGURE 2: SHARE OF MOBILE EXPENDITURE PER MONTH IN TERMS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME.
PRICE ELASTICITY / E-USAGE
Price elasticity describes the magnitude and also therefore the responsiveness of a demand
change for a product in respect of a price change. Graphically expressed, the price elasticity is
– ceteris paribus – the slope of the demand curve, dependent on the price.
e
p = 
!Q/Q
!P/P
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Where: Q= quantity demanded; P = price of the good and e
p
= price elasticity.
The price elasticity of demand is in almost all cases, except for inferior goods, negative;
if the price increases the demand decreases. To simplify the notation, demand elasticities
are in general expressed in absolute value and therefore expressed as positive (Frank &
Bernanke, 2003).
Milne (2006) provides a very intuitive argument for the changing structure of price
elasticity in a hypothetical case. She argues that when phones become available for the first
time in a low-income community and usage charges or tariffs are relatively high (in terms of
income) people will make a limited number of essential calls. In such a scenario, even if the
price falls by a small amount the number of such calls, for instance in an emergency or
substituting a telephone call for a bus ride to a city, will not increase by much. In other words
price elasticity will be relatively low (much less than -1). But, as prices fall, in a much cheaper
service environment she argues that people will start using the phone for many non-essential
purposes, ranging from relationship maintenance to simple conveniences. Add to this pricing
innovations that enable poorer people to purchase small denomination pre-paid calling cards
to make phone calls and it becomes intuitive that the number of calls made will increase
significantly. Milne (2006) argues that when this happens, the price elasticity will rapidly rise
towards -1 or even more than -1.
TABLE 9: MOBILE PENETRATION (SOURCE: RIA 2007/2008 HOUSEHOLD SURVEY)
Monthly Current 16+ with 16+ with Total Share of
average market mobile more number of number Prepaid
mobile in US$ phone or than one duplicated of active users
expenditure million active SIM SIM card SIM cards SIM cards
in US$
Benin 8.33 11.38 1 365 851 30.2% 496 917 1 173 454 2 047 486 95.96%
Botswana 10.18 6.67 654 737 59.5% 61 670 129 323 722 390 99.28%
Burkina Faso 5.84 10.77 1 844 701 27.2% 380 945 943 819 2 408 616 96.69%
Cameroon 7.14 21.29 2 979 597 36.5% 240 473 600 756 3 440 472 88.04%
Côte d’Ivoire 12.52 63.13 5 042 524 41.8% 762 295 1 741 585 6 037 870 91.77%
Ethiopia 3.81 5.29 1 387 910 3.2% 8 379 17 282 1 410 159 88.31%
Ghana 10.44 78.23 7 491 378 59.8% 832 341 1 969 676 8 691 409 99.83%
Kenya 10.41 112.11 10 772 696 52.0% 2 796 971 5 932 015 13 984 190 98.89%
Mozambique 6.26 30.47 4 865 758 25.7% 143 404 286 808 5 012 287 98.89%
Namibia 11.41 7.14 625 707 49.3% 39 090 83 807 670 424 89.95%
Nigeria* 10.88 686.54 63 101 014 77.3% 12 265 752 26 381 512 77 954 949 99.33%
Rwanda 6.02 3.13 520 259 9.9% 16 170 32 340 536 429 94.77%
Senegal 11.00 27.54 2 502 300 39.8% 125 251 291 243 2 705 744 99.70%
South Africa 15.88 320.49 20 185 135 62.1% 2 200 647 4 845 907 22 938 052 78.64%
Tanzania 7.44 30.79 4 138 338 21.5% 602 730 1 301 997 5 070 790 96.95%
Uganda 5.75 16.81 2 924 095 20.7% 526 378 1 097 654 3 505 813 97.84%
Zambia* 10.55 25.96 2 459 961 45.5% 110 683 253 279 2 605 368 99.7%
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One of the biggest problems in estimating price elasticity of demand (PED) for telecom
services in developing country situations is the lack of accurate usage data. Unlike in
developed countries where usage is easily obtainable from monthly bills for post-paid
connections, the vast majority in developing countries, in the case of the current study between
78% and 99%, have no billing records (for prepaid shares see Table 9). Many use public phones,
phones at work or other people’s phones which also does not generate records.
FIGURE 3: IF CALLS WERE CHEAPER WHAT WOULD YOU DO? 
Source: RIA 2007/2008 household survey.
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FIGURE 4: AVERAGE REACTION TO COST OF USING YOUR PHONE GOING DOWN BY HALF OR
DOUBLING
Source: RIA 2007/2008 household survey
Another difficulty is that cross-section data, like those being analysed here, are not suitable
to calculate price elasticities since data are only captured for one snapshot at a time. Changes
in consumer behaviour due to price changes can only be analysed using time-series data. Cross
section data only allow a rough glimpse at price elasticities by using contingent valuation
methods. Respondents with mobile phone or active SIM card were asked how they would react
to price decreases and increases. The answers to these questions are displayed in Figure 3
and  Figure 4. Figure 3 shows that the vast majority of respondents would make more calls if
prices were to come down. Senegal and Ethiopia are the two countries with the highest share
of respondents that would use the saved money for something else.
Figure 4 shows how respondents state that they would react to a doubling or halving of
call charges. What can be seen in the response is asymmetrical, ie respondents would react
to price increases more strongly than they would do to price decreases. However,
approximating price elasticity from these two contingent valuation results is, strictly
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speaking, not possible. Respondents state their preferences and do not reveal observed
behaviour reacting to price changes.
TABLE 10: MOBILE WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO PAY
16+ without a mobile Willing and able to spend Average Monthly
phone or active SIM card more than: monthly untapped
WTP in market in
US$ of US$ 
potential million
US$1 US$2 US$5 users
Benin 69.8% 3 162 099 2 797 101 1 402 507 161 217 2.94 8.26 
Botswana 40.5% 446 140 311 446 199 511 66 192 4.28 1.47 
Burkina Faso 72.8% 4 929 897 4 371 694 1 875 892 430 952 3.13 13.71 
Cameroon 63.5% 5 177 393 3 452 460 1 855 275 550 724 3.75 13.14 
Côte d’Ivoire 58.2% 7 033 592 4 485 498 3 645 855 1 677 528 6.86 31.44 
Ethiopia 96.8% 42 497 353 10 231 145 3 104 395 74 428 1.53 25.68 
Ghana 40.2% 5 036 815 2 849 435 1 953 135 984 279 9.34 38.40 
Kenya 48.0% 9 941 748 5 866 299 5 235 785 1 245 083 3.30 25.69 
Mozambique 74.3% 14 078 222 1 407 840 1 199 765 376 037 2.96 6.70 
Namibia 50.7% 644 056 275 364 247 254 71 171 4.88 1.35 
Nigeria 22.7% 18 541 687 7 989 151 6 234 941 5 128 000 6.09 65.25 
Rwanda 90.1% 4 735 492 
Senegal 60.2% 3 779 221 3 428 481 1 294 681 502 730 3.28 11.33 
South Africa 37.9% 12 331 758 7 604 512 5 551 777 2 209 625 4.34 36.27 
Tanzania 78.5% 15 066 652 5 560 959 4 750 935 1 064 087 2.61 21.42 
Uganda 79.3% 11 174 801 
Zambia* 54% 2 944 732 1 933 833 1 310 576 329 922 3.45 8.20
Source: RIA 2007/2008 household survey
Table 10 presents data on the untapped market, those 16 years or older that do not have a
mobile or active SIM card at present. It shows the results for the number of people that could
be reached with US$1, US$2 and US$5 Average Revenue per Users (ARPU) business models.
CONCLUSION
This paper shows that countries differ in their levels of ICT adoption and usage and also in the
factors that influence adoption and usage. Income and education vastly enhances mobile
adoption but gender, age and membership of social networks have little impact. Income is the
main explanatory variable for usage. In terms of mobile expenditure the study also finds
linkages to fixed-line, work and public phone usages. These linkages need, however, to be
explored in more detail in future. Mobile expenditure proves to be inelastic with regard to
income, ie as income increases mobile expenditure increases to a lesser extent indicating its
importance in individual budgets.
Key policy interventions would be regulatory measures to increase access and usage of
mobile services by promoting network investment. The current super profits being enjoyed by
37
the southern african journal of information and communication issue 9 2008
02 mobile telephony.qxp  2009/03/31  08:31 AM  Page 37
operators across the continent as a result of prices that are among the highest in the world
need to be moderated. In most markets there is no effective competition requiring regulatory
interventions to ensure cost-based wholesale and retail pricing.
Increasing Coverage: Licence fees for infrastructure investment should cover the
administrative and usage costs of national resources only. The current high cost of licences in
most countries used to generate funds for state coffers translate to high prices for consumers
as operators recover their licence costs. Countries need to look at incentives, not disincentives,
to encourage network rollouts.
Wider Access: Access prices can be reduced by exempting telecommunication equipment,
in particular mobile handsets and services from import duties and additional taxes.
Allow more Usage: Policy measures to increase the competition within the industry are the
best mechanisms to reduce usage costs. In a competitive environment the operator can choose
to compete on price or on service quality. Regulatory measures can improve competition on
price by creating price transparency. 
Price Transparency: Contract and prepaid tariffs vary across operators to an extent that
a product to product comparison is impossible for consumers. Non-transparent pricing,
including rapidly changing promotions and misleading media campaigns, make it difficult for
end users to make informed decisions. This prevents operators from having to compete on
prices and leads to higher average prices. Establishing price transparency on the basis of
published monthly usage baskets will make the cost to the end user transparent and force
operators to compete on price or service quality.
Cost-based Interconnection Rates: Above cost interconnection charges are often used by
dominant operators to restrict small operators from gaining market share. High
interconnection charges make off-net calls expensive and punish consumers or small
operators. Cost-based interconnection rates (or benchmarked on cost base) increase the
competition between operators and hence lead to lower usage cost.
Licences for Low ARPU business models: Regulators should award additional licences to
applicants that are able to offer low ARPU business models, preferably below US$2.
The correct policy and regulatory measures can boost mobile access and usage. Avoiding
sector and service-specific levies and additional taxes will result in lower recovery costs and
therefore lower prices. Lower prices would allow millions of people currently unable to afford
access to mobile services to do so and allow those currently restricting their usage as a result
of the high cost of services to use services more extensively and effectively. This is likely to
produce greater profits for companies overall and governments will as a consequence have
even more money in their coffers due to taxes on greater operator revenues. "
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